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Abstract
In February of 2009 and 2010, President Obama made what some in the media
and gaming industries construed as negative public statements regarding trips to Las
Vegas. Some claimed these statements could easily be interpreted as a suggestion that
companies and individuals avoid casino areas, thus doing additional harm to their
surrounding economies during already tough times. In this paper, we use event study
methodology to examine stock market reactions of U.S. casino-related businesses to
the president’s statements. We find that President Obama’s statements were followed by
significant negative abnormal returns in the segment of companies targeted more towards
conventions, trade shows, and tourism, and by significant positive abnormal returns for
companies with more of a local/regional focus. Our findings suggest that the president’s
statements did not adversely affect all casino-related businesses, but they also were not
benign.
Keywords: bully pulpit, casinos, cumulative abnormal returns, event studies, gaming,
Las Vegas, presidential rhetoric, stock market
Introduction
At a town hall meeting in Elkhart, Indiana, on February 9, 2009, U.S. President
Barack Obama commented on companies that received federal “bailout” funds during
the financial crisis, “You are not going to be able to give out these big bonuses until
you’ve paid taxpayers back, you can’t get corporate jets, you can’t go take a trip to Las
Vegas or go down to the Super Bowl on the taxpayer’s dime” (Mayor Goodman Writes,
2009, 9). Businesspeople and individuals associated with the city were concerned that
the general public would infer a different message from President Obama’s comments
and the subsequent news reports. The mayor of Las Vegas, Oscar Goodman, summed up
this concern in an interview with Fox News stating, “…with a rather reckless, cavalier
remark on the part of the president, which will not be discerned by the average person in
the public to apply to those folks who are receiving money, but as a general proposition,
the message was, don’t come to Las Vegas” (CAVUTO, 2009, 12).
Within days following the president’s comment, several companies had already
cancelled planned events in Las Vegas, including a three-day Goldman Sachs technology
conference and a State Farm agents’ convention estimated at 17,000 attendees (Friess,
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2009). Goldman Sachs relocated its conference to San Francisco despite incurring a
$600,000 cancellation fee (Friess, 2009). It seemed as though corporate trips to casino
destination cities would raise eyebrows, a fact that convention and tourism officials in
other cities across the U.S. would use to try to steal customers. Mayor Goodman argued,
“People are telling me that they’re not coming to Las Vegas because the president
doesn’t want them to…There’s an impression out there that somehow if you come to Las
Vegas, it’s going to reflect on your business culture, and that’s a bunch of hooey” (Friess,
2009, 11).
On February 2, 2010, President Obama made a similar statement to that of a year
prior, but this time the focus was on households rather than corporations. Speaking at
a town hall meeting in Nashua, New Hampshire, the president said, “When times are
tough, you tighten your belts…You don’t go buying a boat when you can barely pay
your mortgage. You don’t blow a bunch of cash on Vegas when you’re trying to save
for college” (President Obama Again, 2010, 2). Mayor Goodman again voiced his
frustration, calling the President a “real slow learner” and stating that when he comes to
town, “I’ll do everything I can to give him the boot” (Ayres, 2010, 2 & 10).
Theodore Roosevelt is credited with first use of the term “bully pulpit” to describe
the extraordinary influence attributed to the rhetoric of the President of the United
States. President Obama has himself recognized this influence and acknowledged the
ability of his spoken words to impact the behavior of his constituents, stating, “When
you’re president, you’ve got the bully pulpit” (In Obama’s Words, 2010, 21). This was
preceded a few months earlier by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs stating, “I think that the
bully pulpit can be a powerful thing” (Clifford, 2009, 18). In this paper, we examine this
hypothesis in the context of President Obama’s two statements regarding corporate and
individual behavior towards patronizing Las Vegas.
Convention and tourism business was already slumping in Las Vegas by 2009.
But did the president’s words carry sufficient weight to further affect individual and
corporate behavior? In a perfect world, a researcher would conduct an economic analysis
by comparing factors like employment, wages, output, prices, and investment after
the president made his statements to the same factors in an otherwise identical setting
in which the president did not make his statements. Unfortunately, this procedure
is impossible. As a proxy, one could examine these factors before and after each of
President Obama’s statements and attempt to compare them to other areas unaffected by
said statements. This is an extremely difficult exercise for a variety of reasons, some of
which include the difficulty of completely and accurately gathering the necessary data,
the difficulty of finding suitable control groups, the time lag associated with changes in
employment, wages, prices, and investment due to the statements, and the wide range of
confounding factors that could occur during this lag.
We use an alternative proxy technique which analyzes the U.S. stock market reaction
to President Obama’s statements using event study methodology. This type of analysis
measures the relationship of an event to the market value of affected businesses. Value is
determined by investors who tend to be well-educated in the relevant markets, especially
institutional investors, and have a strong financial incentive to act truthfully on their
beliefs. The reliability of investor perceptions of value when estimating the incremental
effect of a single event on a company is quite different from the reliability of their
perceptions over time when Keynesian “animal spirits” and other types of irrational
exuberance can set in and cause asset bubbles.
The specific research questions we address are:
Question 1 What is the price response (stock return) associated with President
Obama’s statements for U.S. casino-related stocks?
Question 2 How, if at all, does this response differ across casino-related stock
segments?
Whether intentional or not, President Obama’s comments were targeted at Las Vegas.
However, his comments could also be interpreted more generally towards other U.S.
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gaming destinations or any local casino. Thus, the economic impact is not necessarily
confined to Las Vegas alone. If there is an impact, casino gaming properties and resorts
would be directly affected while other businesses would be affected in an indirect manner.
Therefore, we examine casino-related stocks with U.S. brick-and-mortar operations in
this paper.
Our findings suggest that President Obama’s statements were not benign, but in
a manner different than what one may naturally expect. At face value, both of the
president’s statements tended to encourage a targeted reduction in demand towards casino
properties, which should result in negative stock reactions. However, we find a negative
stock reaction only for a distinct segment of casino companies, and we observe a positive
stock reaction for a separate segment.
We wish to emphasize that the issue of causality can be a tricky one. In empirical
research, it is a statistical assumption (the unconfoundedness assumption). We do not
make that assumption and are not familiar with event studies that explicitly do so,
although results are often discussed with a somewhat causal feel because of the statistical
design. Readers, however, should refrain from using this type of causal language when
interpreting these results. In that spirit, we avoid direct causal statements, and we also
incorporate a discussion specifically addressing the issue of causality as it relates to event
studies.
Literature Review
Event Studies
Event study research was developed in the late 1960s. It is based on a foundation of
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which was formalized by Fama (1970) and is
considered a cornerstone of modern finance theory. In its semi-strong form, the EMH
states that the market will process all information as soon as it is publicly available and
will adjust prices immediately to be in line with the value-relevancy of the information.
Considerable research has been done in finance and accounting, providing robust
evidence of semi-strong form market efficiency (Fama, 1970; Fama, Fisher, Jenson,
& Roll, 1969; Malkiel, 2005). In theory, price responses should be
immediate and complete. However, some research has shown that while
A number of studies have an initial response is immediate, the complete response may take a
examined the content of State few trading days (Atiase, Li, Supattarakul, & Tse, 2005; Beaver, 1968;
of the Union addresses and Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980; May, 1971).
Researchers have taken the idea of the EMH and used it as a basis
found that presidential emphasis for determining the economic impact of disseminated information. In
on particular issues increases seminal studies, Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) assessed the
public concern for said issues impact of accounting information by examining the release of earnings
announcements. This started a research track that has taken a wider view
to include various types of value-relevant information such as dividends,
stock splits, earnings forecasts, changes in accounting processes, and changes in the tax
code.
More broadly, any event that has information which is economically-relevant to
publicly-traded companies can be examined through the lens of event studies and the
EMH. Event studies have been used to investigate a great number of topics including the
impact of antitrust filings on companies’ competitors (Bittlingmayer & Hazlett, 2000),
the effect of macroeconomic news on stock prices (McQueen & Roley, 1993), the impact
of a corporate name change on companies with Internet-related dotcom names (Cooper,
Dimitrov, & Rau, 2001), and the effect of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident on
public utility companies (Hill & Schneeweis, 1983).
Presidential Influence
  Prior research provides evidence that the types of presidential administrations may
have an influence on the stock market. Niederhoffer, Gibbs, and Bullock (1970), Riley
and Luksetich (1980), and Siegel (1998) found that the stock market performs better in
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the days and weeks following the election of a Republican president as compared to a
Democratic president. Stovall (1992) found that stock market returns are greater during
entire Democratic administrations than Republican administrations. Johnson, Chittenden,
and Jensen (1999) extended this analysis by showing that there is no difference on the
returns of large-cap stocks, but there is a substantial difference on small-cap stocks, with
significantly higher returns during Democratic administrations.
The notion of the bully pulpit, i.e., the influence of presidential rhetoric on public
opinion and behavior, is not new. President Obama and his staff have spoken openly of it,
but this support is only anecdotal. Scientific evidence examining the power of presidential
rhetoric is somewhat mixed. A number of studies have examined the content of State of the
Union addresses and found that presidential emphasis on particular issues increases public
concern for said issues (Cohen, 1995; Hill, 1998; Lawrence, 2002). Young and Perkins
(2005) showed that this influence has diminished in recent years due to the changing
structure and penetration of cable television. However, Edwards (2003) found little effect
of presidential speeches on public opinion.
Wood, Owens, and Durham (2005) found that presidential statements about the
economy affect the public’s perception of economic news and consumer confidence, and
that this may have a meaningful impact on macroeconomic performance variables. They
concluded, “The president’s words are a powerful instrument of economic leadership
that can affect consumer perceptions of current and future economic conditions” (Wood,
Owens, & Durham, 2005). Might this also extend to perceptions of future business activity
and firm value in a particular industry? This paper adds to the literature on the influence
of presidential rhetoric by examining the impact of two well-publicized, gaming-related
presidential statements on the value of companies in the casino resort industry.
Method
Study Design
Our analysis uses well-developed event study methodology from modern finance
theory. From a research perspective, this structure has many useful features. It is
easy to gather complete and accurate data, a control group is not needed (other than
controlling for general market movements), stock market reactions occur very quickly
as information is disseminated, and investors tend to be well-informed and have their
money, or their jobs, on the line. Additionally, event studies that examine clearlydistinguishable events with daily stock returns (as opposed to weekly or monthly returns)
have been shown in prior research to be very powerful, straightforward, and trouble-free
(Kothari & Warner, 2007).
Every trading day an individual stock has a return, defined as the percent change in
the stock price, inclusive of any dividends. The impact of general market movements
on a stock’s price can be characterized as its normal return. The abnormal return is
the impact of company- or industry-specific occurrences on a stock’s price. To obtain
abnormal returns, we first estimate the market model over a 101-day estimation period
for each stock. In this model,
, t = –110, …, –10
where t represents the number of trading days before (negative number) or after
(positive number) the event date of t = 0,

is the return for firm i on day t,

is the return on an equally-weighted market portfolio on day t, and

and

are

regression parameters estimated as
and
by OLS over days –110 to –10 in event
time. The event date is February 9, 2009 for 2009 regressions and February 2, 2010 for
2010 regressions. The market model has been shown in simulations to have superior
performance relative to other event study models (Armitage, 1995; Brown & Warner,
1985; Lee & Varela, 1997) and the equally-weighted market index has been shown to
have superior performance relative to other market indices (Corrado, 2011).
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Abnormal returns (ARs) for firm i are calculated as

. t = –110, …, 4
Since the complete price response to new information can potentially take several
days, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated over multiple trading days
known as the event window. In this paper, we construct CARs using a primary event
window and two alternate windows
,
,
,
where

uses an asymmetric (around t = 0) 3-day event window,

(Primary)
(Alternate)
(Alternate)
uses an

asymmetric 5-day event window, and
uses the 3-day window just prior to the
event (the pre-event window). We use an asymmetric event window because there is no
question as to the timing of President Obama’s statements which, by all accounts, were
completely unanticipated, eliminating concern about pre-announcement information
leaks.1 Three days is the most common window length for short-horizon event studies
using daily returns (Bartholdy, Olson, & Peare, 2007) and, thus, is our primary window
length. We use two alternate event windows to perform sensitivity analyses, the 5-day
window and the pre-event window. The additional days in the 5-day window allow for a
full trading week of media response.
The Sample
Stocks were selected from Hoover’s “Gambling Resorts & Casinos” industry
classification, which defines inclusion as “Companies that own, operate, and/or manage
casino gaming operations, casino/resort hotel facilities, riverboat casinos, and other
gaming properties” (Hoovers, 2011) Selected companies had to be traded on the NYSE,
AMEX, or NASDAQ stock exchanges during February of 2009 and 2010 and have U.S.
brick-and-mortar gaming operations. Stocks that fit these criteria composed our initial
list. For each company, we collected stock price information for days t =
, …, 4
using the CRSP daily data set. We also collected data for the equally-weighted market
index for use in the market model. We then filtered the initial list by year, excluding
stocks that had an earnings announcement, dividend announcement, stock split, or
significant company-specific news event within five trading days of February 9, 2009 or
February 2, 2010, respectively. This was done to exclude stocks with known noise that
would confound the analysis. Our initial stock list and the filtered list for each year can
be seen in Table 1. Notable companies for which data were not available are Foxwoods
Casino Resort, Harrah’s Entertainment, Station Casinos, and Trump Entertainment
Resorts.2
Different businesses cater to and target different types of customers. Although casinorelated companies contain a variety of types of properties, information on their target
customers and competition is available in their annual 10K reports. We segmented each
company in our filtered list into one of two categories: CTT companies focused more
towards conventions, trade shows, and tourists and Non-CTT companies generally
focused more towards local or regional customers. Segmentation was performed
on the basis of statements in their 10K reports regarding their target customers and
competition, as well as on information regarding their meeting facilities. With respect
1

2

Symmetric windows are used to analyze events where a portion of the information was reasonably anticipated. Examples include corporate earnings announcements, tax policy changes, and new government
regulations. In these cases, there is often extensive discussion, debate, and/or speculation leading up to the
event, which is likely to impact stock prices before the actual event occurs
Foxwoods is privately owned by the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, Harrah’s was delisted and taken
private in January 2008, Station was delisted and taken private in November 2007, and Trump filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy and received a delisting notice in February 2009.
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to 10K statements, we looked to see whether conventioneers, trade shows, and tourism
were a focal point of the discussion of target customers and competition. With respect to
meeting facilities, eight properties of CTT companies were ranked in Tradeshow Week’s
top 101 hotel exhibit halls for 2008, and each company had at least one property on the
list. Non-CTT companies did not have any properties on the list. We manually added a
few properties to the list by nature of their affiliation to large exhibit halls, even though
the exhibit halls of the properties themselves did not make the cut. These properties are
still able to target the convention and corporate events customer segments because of
these affiliations. Venetian and Palazzo, Las Vegas Sands properties, were added due to
their affiliation with the Sands Expo Center. Encore, a Wynn Resorts property, was added
due to its affiliation with Wynn Las Vegas. Atlantis Casino Resort, a Monarch Casino
& Resort property, was added due to its affiliation with the Reno-Sparks Convention
Center (the two are physically connected via an enclosed skybridge). The criteria were
applied evenly and consistently to each property of CTT and Non-CTT companies. Our
segmented stock list can be seen in Table 1. It is important to remember that companies
assigned to the same segment are not necessarily comparable on every characteristic,
only the select characteristics used to segment.
Table 1
Initial, Filtered, and Segmented List of Stocks Used in Analyses

Results
Descriptive Statistics and Histograms
Descriptive statistics of ARs and CARs for all three event windows are shown in
Table 2. None of the means is significantly different from zero. Separate histograms of
ARs and CARs for all companies using the primary 3-day event window are shown in
Figure 1. Both distributions are reasonably symmetric around zero, appearing to support
a hypothesis that President Obama’s statements were benign. These basic results are
relatively trivial and do not support a bully pulpit hypothesis.
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2 of Abnormal Returns
Descriptive Table
Statistics
Descriptive Statistics of Abnormal Returns
Mean
3-Day Event Window

25

“Don’t Blow a Bunch of Cash on Vegas:”

S .D.

N

Daily Abnormal Returns
2009
2010
Both Years

.0036
-.0027
.0006

.0345
.0255
.0305

27
24
51

Cumulative Abnormal Returns
2009
2010
Both Years

.0108
-.0082
.0019

.0530
.0232
.0416

9
8
17

Daily Abnormal Returns
2009
2010
Both Years

.0010
.0022
.0016

.0371
.0238
.0314

45
40
85

Cumulative Abnormal Returns
2009
2010
Both Years

.0051
.0111
.0079

.0828
.0363
.0634

9
8
17

Daily Abnormal Returns
2009
2010
Both Years

-.0089
.0044
-.0026

.0458
.0315
.0399

27
24
51

Cumulative Abnormal Returns
2009
2010
Both Years

-.0266
.0133
-.0078

.0676
.0380
.0578

9
8
17

5-Day Event Window

3-Day Pre-Event Window

Note. None of the means is significantly different from zero for α = .01.
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Daily Abnormal Returns

Cumulative Abnormal Returns

Figure 1. Frequency histograms of daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal
returns. Abnormal return bins are on the x-axis. Returns are over a 3-day event window
for all stocks for 2009 and 2010 combined.

In Figure 2, we plot separate histograms of ARs and CARs for CTT and Non-CTT
companies. For the AR histograms, a majority of the mass is on the negative return
side in the CTT category and on the positive return side in the Non-CTT category. This
gives rise to the question, could President Obama’s statements have been beneficial to
some casino-related companies while detrimental to others? The picture becomes clearer
with the examination of cumulative abnormal returns. There is a stark difference in the
distributions of CARs across segments. All CTT stocks have negative CARs, while
all but one of the Non-CTT stocks have positive CARs. While daily abnormal returns
are a bit noisier, the cumulative effect over three trading days is abundantly clear. This
evidence is visually striking and quite interesting in its implications. However, it is not
rigorous and runs the risk of leading to faulty inferences if, in fact, randomness was the
true underlying cause.
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Daily Abnormal Returns
CTT Stocks

Non-CTT Stocks

Cumulative Abnormal Returns
CTT Stocks

Non-CTT Stocks

Figure 2. Frequency histograms of daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal
returns by type of stock. Abnormal return bins are on the x-axis. Returns are over a 3day event window for all stocks for 2009 and 2010 combined. CTT is convention, trade
show, and tourist companies.

Statistical Tests
We test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 2

for CTT stocks and all event windows
for Non-CTT stocks and all event windows

Hypothesis 3
for all stocks and all event windows.
When performing statistical analyses, the strength of the findings are enhanced if it
can be shown that the researcher’s assumptions are not driving the results. Sensitivity
analysis is useful in this regard. We conduct sensitivity analyses using four different
types of tests, detailed below, on three different event windows and three different stock
categories. All test results were qualitatively similar when using a value-weighted market
index rather than an equally-weighted one.
Potential hazards. The nature of this endeavor leads to small sample sizes due to
the relatively small number of U.S. publicly-traded, casino-related stocks. Applying the
requisite filtering criteria makes sample sizes even smaller. Out of nine filtered stocks
in 2009, three are in the CTT segment and six are in the Non-CTT segment. Out of
eight filtered stocks in 2010, four are in the CTT segment and four are in the Non-CTT
segment. If we combine both years together and define the event as the 2009 or 2010
UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal ♦ Volume 15 Issue 2

67

public statement towards Las Vegas by President Obama, then out of 17 filtered stocks,
seven are in the CTT segment and ten are in the Non-CTT segment.
These small samples lead to two primary concerns when running
These small samples lead to two
statistical tests: the power of the test and the applicability of the
primary concerns when running
asymptotic properties of the estimators.
statistical tests: the power of
When performing statistical tests from event studies, there are
generally three major concerns: misspecification, event-induced
the test and the applicability of
volatility, and event-time clustering. Misspecification occurs when
the asymptotic properties of the
the assumptions of a parametric model are incorrect. Event-induced
estimators.
volatility occurs when stock return variance increases or decreases as
a result of the event taking place. Controlling for this in an efficient
manner will lead to proper Type I and II error rates. Event-time clustering occurs when
a single event on a specific date impacts multiple companies or multiple industries at the
same time. Examples include the 2010 financial reform act, interest rate announcements
by the Federal Reserve, and the September 11th terrorist attacks. Event-time clustering,
including the presidential statements in the present study, can cause stock return crosscorrelation which can lead to erroneously high rejection rates of hypothesis tests if
not properly controlled. Researchers have developed parametric and nonparametric
estimators to effectively control for these potential hazards (Boehmer, Musumeci,
& Poulsen, 1991; Corrado, 1989; Corrado & Zivney, 1992; Cowan, 1992; Cowan &
Sergeant, 1996; Jaffe, 1974; Kolari & Pynnonen, 2010a; Kolari & Pynnonen, 2010b;
Wilcoxon, 1945).
Parametric tests. We use adjusted versions of the BMP test and the portfolio test for
parametric analysis. The BMP test statistic, developed by Boehmer et al. (1991), accounts
for possible event-induced volatility in stock returns. Return volatility may increase
(variance inflation) or decrease (variance deflation) due to an event. The BMP test, one
of the most commonly used parametric tests for event studies, controls for either of these
scenarios. It has also been shown to be efficient and have a high level of power (Kolari &
Pynnonen, 2010a). The portfolio test was developed by Jaffe (1974). It is frequently used
when returns are potentially cross-correlated (Kolari & Pynnonen, 2010a), such as in our
current study with event-time clustering due to the common event date for each of the
president’s statements.3
Each test
is “adjusted”
control
forON
both
potential cross-correlation and event-induced 27
“DON’T
BLOW
A BUNCHtoOF
CASH
VEGAS”
volatility. In terms of their general construction, the BMP test assesses whether sums of
standardized CARs are sufficiently far from zero and the Portfolio test performs a similar
procedure, but on an equally-weighted portfolio of the stocks in the sample (see references
for
more
Table
3 detailed information). The results of these tests are shown in Table 3.4
Table 3
Parametric Test Statistics of Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Stock Type
Parametric Test Statistics of Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Stock Type

Adjusted BMP Test
3-Day Window
CTT
Non-CTT
All

2009

2010

Both Years

-2.55**
2.90***
.40

-3.19***
3.29***
-.71

-5.00***
3.77***
-.19

5-Day
3 The portfolio
test Window
cannot be performed on data for both years combined due to the manner in which it is
   constructed. CTT
**
-4.07***
4 The adjusted BMP test statistics are asymptotically standard normal.-1.25
Small sample size-2.38
is not a significant
**
   concern because
the test statistic is derived from a standardized
sum of a small number of t-statistics
with
***
Non-CTT
1.97
   99 degrees of freedom. Thus, each t-statistic is very close to standard 1.64
normal. Therefore,2.72
a large sample
.01
   size of stocks All
is not critical to achieve Central Limit Theorem
convergence
z-stat. The ad
.56 from t-stat to .44
   justed portfolio test statistic is a t-statistic with 99 degrees of freedom.
68

3-Day Pre-Event Window
CTT
Non-CTT
All
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-1.49
-.3
-.83

.91
-.19

.27
-.39

3-Day Window
CTT
Non-CTT
All

-2.55**
2.90***
.40

-3.19***
3.29***
-.71

-5.00***
3.77***
-.19

-1.25
1.64
.56

-2.38**
2.72***
.44

.91
-.19
.68

.27
-.39
.00
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5-Day Window
CTT
Non-CTT
All

-4.07***
1.97**
.01

3-Day Pre-Event Window
CTT
Non-CTT
All

-1.49
-.3
-.83

Adjusted Portfolio Test
3-Day Window
CTT
Non-CTT
All

2009

2010

-2.63***
2.48**
.39

-3.13***
3.15***
-.65

5-Day Window
CTT
Non-CTT
All

-4.03***
1.82*
.13

-1.23
1.44
.50

3-Day Pre-Event Window
CTT
Non-CTT
All

-1.49
-.34
-.79

Note. All tests are two-tailed.

.85
-.22
.59

, , and * indicate significance at α = .01, .05, and .10,

*** **

respectively.

The results are noteworthy within each test and are consistent across the tests. There
is a significantly negative return effect on CTT stocks and a significantly positive return
effect on Non-CTT stocks for the 3-day and 5-day event windows. The lone exception
is for the 5-day event window in 2010. In this case, the statistics are of the same sign as
those of the 3-day window and are close to the significance threshold. This weakness
likely results from the additional noise of adding two superfluous days to the event
window. When we combine CTT and Non-CTT stocks and examine them all together,
there is no significant effect. Finally, we test each sample using a control period where
there was no event (the pre-event window). As expected, we obtain weak, insignificant
results all around. The totality of these test results provides robust support for a negative
impact of President Obama’s statements on CTT company returns and a positive impact
UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal ♦ Volume 15 Issue 2
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on Non-CTT company returns.
Nonparametric tests. Nonparametric tests have an added layer of specification
flexibility, but this comes at the cost of a potential loss of efficiency. However, they are
useful ways of checking results and examining the sensitivity of assumptions. We use
the generalized sign test of Cowan (1992) and the generalized rank test of Kolari &
Pynnonen (2010b). Both control for event-induced volatility and cross-correlation and
have been shown to have a high level of power among common alternative estimators
Kolari & Pynnonen, 2010b). The generalized sign test examines the
“DON’T(Cowan,
BLOW A1992;
BUNCH
OF CASH ON VEGAS”
28
proportion of positive CARs in the event window and tests whether it is significantly
different from the proportion of positive abnormal returns observed during the estimation
period. The generalized rank test ranks all abnormal returns from highest to lowest. It
Table 4 then tests whether the ranking of event window CARs is significantly higher or lower
than the average abnormal return rank of the estimation period (i.e., 50%). The results of
these tests are shown in Table 4.

Non-Parametric Test Statistics of Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Stock Type for 2009 and 2010
Combined
Table 4

Non-Parametric Test Statistics of Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Stock Type for 2009
and 2010 Combined
Generalized Generalized

3-Day Window
CTT
Non-CTT
All
5-Day Window
CTT
Non-CTT
All
3-Day Pre-Event Window
CTT
Non-CTT
All

Sign Test

Rank Test

-2.10**
2.37**
.23

-3.36***
3.45***
-.04

-1.35
1.74*
.23

-2.36**
2.71***
.28

.17
-.79
-.74

.16
-.70
.04

Note. Results were qualitatively similar for a sign test using the actual binomial

Note. Results
were qualitatively
similar
for a sign
test approximation
using the actualwith
binomial
distribution
distribution
instead of the
standard
normal
the Central

Limit Theorem.All tests are two-tailed. ***, **, and * indicate significance at α =
and .10,
respectively.
instead of.01,
the.05,
standard
normal
approximation with the Central Limit Theorem.All tests are two-

tailed.

, , and * indicate significance at α = .01, .05, and .10, respectively.

*** **

Given the construction of the nonparametric tests, small sample size is more of a
concern. We do not have enough data to possibly obtain meaningful results from the
nonparametric tests when examining each year separately. When we examine both years
combined, we find similar statistical results to the parametric tests: significantly negative
returns to CTT stocks and significantly positive returns to Non-CTT stocks using the
primary 3-day window, results of the same magnitude but with mixed significance using
the alternate 5-day window, insignificant results when examining all stocks together,
and insignificant results for all categories when using the pre-event window. The
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nonparametric tests reinforce the findings of the parametric tests under a less restrictive
set of assumptions.
Economic significance. Statistical significance supports the notion that President
Obama’s statements had a non-zero effect on different types of casino-related businesses.
Economic significance examines if the non-zero effect is meaningful. We find that
the statements of the president were associated with a 2-7% reduction in market
capitalization for CTT companies and a 1-6% increase in market capitalization for NonCTT companies.

Discussion and Conclusions
Our analysis supports the hypothesis that presidential rhetoric can
have a real impact on public behavior towards a particular industry
with President Obama’s statements adversely affecting CTT companies
and positively affecting Non-CTT companies in our sample. While one
cannot statistically prove that a particular theory is true, the evidence
is consistent with a theory that the president’s statements discouraged
a sizeable number of individuals and businesses from travel to CTT
casino areas, but did not discourage individuals from gambling at and
frequenting all casinos. In this case, his comments might have merely
shifted the behavior to other locations and venues.
By definition, it is unlikely that conventions and corporate events
would shift from CTT casinos to Non-CTT casinos, so the reduction in
these events was likely shifted to other CTT locations without gaming
(e.g., San Francisco) or eliminated altogether. So what is driving the positive effect on
Non-CTT casino companies? Our results support the notion that while individuals may
have taken fewer overall gambling trips or downsized/downgraded their gambling trips,
they continued to frequent Non-CTT casinos and marginally shifted some gambling
activities to such properties; e.g., downgrading trips from CTT properties to Non-CTT
properties or substituting local/regional Non-CTT gambling for more expensive CTT
trips. Ariely (2008) and Thaler and Sunstein (2008) discuss interesting economic research
about how incentives, expectations, and verbal cues can affect individual behavior.
There are a few caveats to our analysis. First, a few notable companies were not
included because their stock was not publicly-traded. This does not diminish the
relevance or significance of our analysis of publicly-traded companies, but it does mean
that external validity is not certain and care should be taken when forming out-of-sample
conclusions. Second, some casino-related companies are composed of a variety of types
of subsidiaries. The process of segmenting companies into CTT and Non-CTT segments
is not simple and unambiguous. While it can be tempting to be guided by anecdotal
evidence or opinion, we instead employed dispassionate criteria in an attempt to segment
different types of casino-related companies on the basis of specific characteristics.
Finally, we do not perform an analysis of underlying economic data such as output
and employment. This type of analysis is extremely difficult to credibly perform and is
fraught with complications. Instead, we examine how the stock prices of casino-related
companies behaved before and immediately after President Obama’s statements, using
the directional change in market value as a proxy for economic impact.
Did President Obama’s statements cause the change in investor perceptions of future
business activity and therefore the change in market value? Rigorous event studies
attempt to address questions of this type through a classic pre-test/post-test design. The
market model is calibrated to the period before the event in order to analyze the period
after the event, while the market portfolio serves as a quasi-control group. Firm- and
industry-specific confounding factors are controlled for by excluded firms with known
earnings announcements, stock split announcements, dividend announcements, or

The evidence is consistent with
a theory that the president’s
statements discouraged a
sizeable number of individuals
and businesses from travel to
CTT casino areas, but did not
discourage individuals from
gambling at and frequenting all
casinos.
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significant news events.5 Our specific study adds another layer of reliability by finding
insignificant results in the pre-event window (i.e., the pre-test period). This type of
design does not and cannot prove causality as causality itself is an assumption (Holland,
1986).6
Our model shows that after imposing proper controls, CTT and Non-CTT company
stock prices behave differently after the president’s statements than they did before,
relative to the market, and the direction of this difference is consistent with the
statements having a negative impact on CTT companies and a positive impact on NonCTT companies. As with any empirical study, we reject the null hypothesis (no effect)
within standard statistical boundaries and can only state that the observed results are
consistent with certain hypotheses.  Could there be some omitted variable that is the
hidden, underlying cause of the changes? This question could be asked of any empirical
study and reasonableness should be the guide, not absolute proof.
When examining all casino-related companies in our dataset, results initially support
the benign nature of the president’s statements about Las Vegas. But,
President Obama’s statements
after recognizing that different types of companies may be affected
in different ways, we find strong results when analyzing CTT and
were not negatively associated
Non-CTT casino segments separately. Results are the strongest with
with all publicly-traded, casinothe primary 3-day window and are slightly weaker with the alternate
related companies, nor were they
5-day event window, which contains additional noise. During the
pre-event control period, we would expect statistically insignificant
negatively associated with all
results for both casino segments as well as for all companies
Las Vegas casino companies.
combined. As expected, all results are weak during this period.
Furthermore, the results do not appear to be driven by or sensitive
to the assumptions of any particular statistical test, providing additional reliability and
robustness support.
President Obama’s statements were not negatively associated with all publicly-traded,
casino-related companies, nor were they negatively associated with all Las Vegas casino
companies. They corresponded to statistically and economically significant negative
return estimates for CTT casino companies (2-7% reduction in market capitalization) and
statistically and economically significant positive return estimates for Non-CTT casino
companies across the U.S. (1-6% increase in market capitalization). Our findings suggest
that presidential rhetoric can be tailored towards particular industries in a positive or
negative manner, and, whether intentional or not, may have been recently employed in a
non-benign way with President Obama’s two statements about Las Vegas.

5

72

Las Vegas Sands announced earnings below analyst expectations after market close on February 11, 2009,
and was excluded from the analysis. They experienced a significantly negative return shock the following
day. MGM, Wynn, and Monarch did not experience a similar return shock and, in fact, experienced two
positive return shocks and one benign. Thus, they do not appear to be contaminated by the Las Vegas Sands
announcement in a manner that would bias towards a negative effect of the president’s 2009 statement on
CTT companies.
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